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Introduction∗ 
 
In the last decade, the CFSP has been subjected to an increasing institutionalisation which has 
facilitated two key processes: learning and socialisation. The CFSP literature lacks extensive 
empirical research on the occurrence and impact of these two factors particularly at the lower 
levels of the decision-making system. In order to address this gap, this article draws attention to 
the relevance of learning and socialisation and to the way in which they affect the policy process 
and the policy outcome. Learning appears as a key factor behind the institutional development 
of CFSP and can also help to understand adaptational changes in the foreign policies of the 
Member States. For its part, as a result of a particular type of learning –learning the procedural 
rules of a group–, socialisation in the Council Working Groups has an impact on the CFSP 
governance, and even on the policy outcome. The approach adopted here offers a new 
understanding of socialisation not as a passive process of adaptation to the rules of a group, but 
as a tool in the hands of self-reflecting actors.  
 
Drawing on the existing rationalist/constructivist debate, this article calls into question the 
artificial division between rationalist and sociological approaches and in particular, how they 
conceptualise processes of learning and socialisation. These two cognitive processes have 
often been underestimated by realist and intergovernmentalist approaches. For the latter, 
changes in actors’ behaviours are the result of changes in the international distribution of power 
or in material factors. In other words, they only refer to exogenous processes of interest 
construction. In contrast, it is argued here that social and institutional factors affecting 
individuals should be taken into account for a more comprehensive explanation of learning and 
socialisation, especially in the context of CFSP.1 For example, as explained later, learning has 
been facilitated by the CFSP institutional setting. On the other hand, sociological accounts have 
overlooked the possibility of self-reflective actors using socialisation as part of their strategic 
calculations, i.e. strategic socialisation. For its part, the approach presented in this article adopts 
as a starting point the rational actor: even in highly institutionalised frameworks, rationality plays 
a crucial role in determining actors’ behaviour.  Actors are reflexive and take into account the 
social and normative context in which they find themselves when acting strategically. Therefore, 
neither rationalist nor sociological approaches alone can account for these processes. This 
article advocates instead a model which situates self-reflective actors within an institutional 
context.  
 
The argument presented here also points to the specific nature of the second pillar as one the 
factors that may explain specific patterns of learning and socialization in this context. This 
unique nature can be summarized in the two following factors: the mix between the 
intergovernmental and ‘Brusselised’ decision-making process, and the significant role played by 
national representatives in the Council. This article also draws attention to the significance of 
the processes of learning and socialisation taking place at the level of the Working Groups and 
how they affect the policy process and the policy outcome.2 Although the concept of ‘high 
politics’ might suggest that the decisions are mostly taken on high political levels, it is argued 
that the importance of experts’ work on the lower levels should not be underestimated. A large 
                                                 
∗ An earlier version of this article was presented at the Conference on EU Foreign Policy ‘Challenges and 
Options for the Future’ in Brussels, 17 November 2005. The authors express their gratitude to the participants of 
this workshop and to Mike Smith, Sophie Vanhoonacker and an anonymous referee for their invaluable 
comments. Address for correspondence: Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska, Department of Politics, 
International Relations and European Studies, Loughborough University, Loughborough LE11 3TU, UK. e-mails: 
A.E.Juncos@lboro.ac.uk; K.M.Pomorska@lboro.ac.uk 
 
1 The theoretical framework privileged here draws on an institutionalist approach to offer a better understanding 
of how “institutions matter”. For more on New Institutionalist approaches see Hall and Taylor, 1996; March and 
Olsen, 1989; and Peters, 1999.  
2 The role of the CFSP Council Working Groups is to discuss and draft CFSP documents such as Joint Actions, 
Council Conclusions or Action Plans. There are thirty-six permanent CFSP Working Groups that have been set 
following thematic (Transatlantic Relations, Non-Proliferation, Human Rights) or geographical lines (Western 
Balkans, EFTA, Latin America). With the development of ESDP, new Working Groups have been created such 
as the EU Military Committee Working Group. Apart from this, one can add two specialist Working Groups: the 
Nicolaidis Group and the Antici Group, in charge of preparing the agenda of the PSC and COREPER II, 
respectively. Finally, the RELEX Counsellors Group is in charge of ensuring horizontal co-ordination between 
CFSP and communitarian matters.  
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number of issues are resolved here, reaching the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER II) or the Political and Security Committee (PSC) in the form of already agreed 
consensus.  
 
The article is divided into two sections. The first focuses on the process of learning. It begins 
with the conceptualisation of the term, distinguishing between simple/complex and 
individual/organisational learning. It then provides empirical evidence of learning in CFSP, 
pinpointing the facilitating conditions, as well as the channels through which it occurs. In the 
second part, the article focuses on strategic socialisation of national representatives to the 
Council Working Groups. This concept is explained and analysed in the context of CFSP. 
Certain informal rules of behaviour are identified, that form a code of conduct at the Working 
Group level. It addresses in particular the misunderstandings occurring between the diplomats 
in Brussels and in the capitals. Throughout the text the theoretical assumptions are supported 
by examples drawn from recent empirical research on the foreign policy of the EU and its 
Member States.3 It provides evidence to address recent academic debates on the nature and 
significance of learning and strategic socialisation, attempting to link theory to practice.  
 
 
Learning in CFSP 
 
A CFSP model which takes into account how actors learn from changes in their environments 
and from their own experiences can better account for the dynamics of CFSP policy-making. 
According to Ben Tonra, this enables us to formulate “a dynamic model of foreign policy and 
foreign policy change within the EU far richer than that available through strictly rational 
accounts” (2003: 736). Learning appears as an important mechanism explaining change at the 
CFSP level. It is facilitated by the CFSP institutional setting that prompts information-sharing, 
consultation and other communicative practices. In this section, after considering some 
definitional issues regarding learning -mainly, what is learning and the distinction between 
individual and organisational learning-, the article proceeds to explain which institutional 
mechanisms facilitate learning within the CFSP context.  
 
Definition and types of learning 
 
Jack Levy defines learning as “a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) 
or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observations and 
interpretation of experience” (1994: 283).4 Drawing on this definition, learning is conceived here 
as an active process which involves the following stages: 1) observation of your own experience 
or others’ experience; 2) an active interpretation of this new information; 3) a change of beliefs. 
The second stage is important because it allows for a distinction between learning and simple 
imitation or passive assimilation of new information. Learning involves a cognitive process of 
processing information through the lens of one’s previous worldviews that leads to a 
reassessment of prior beliefs. This active process of reassessment does not take place in the 
case of imitation or passive assimilation.  
 
Learning always involves a change in the cognitive structure of actors. Thus, learning can lead 
to a) a change of beliefs or b) a change in the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs. In the latter, 
after processing new information about other actors’ policies, individuals may conclude that their 
model is the most appropriate in that specific situation, reaffirming their prior beliefs. In other 
words, after observing other actors’ models, the lesson drawn would be “how not to do things”, 
what Rose (1991) calls negative lesson-drawing. Positive lesson-drawing would instead mean 
learning about “how to do things”.  
 
For the purpose of this article, learning is seen as a rational process. The concept of rationality 
used here is the one of bounded rationality. This hypothesis acknowledges the limited cognitive 
capacity of individuals. Thus, policy-makers do not dispose of all the necessary information to 
                                                 
3 The primary empirical evidence used in the article was gathered by both authors during their fieldwork in 
Brussels, Warsaw, London, Pristina and Sarajevo. This includes over 80 in-depth interviews with the national 
representatives from several Member States, EU officials and an on-line survey on Council Working Groups.  
4 For a review of learning in foreign policy, see Levy, 1994: 280-282. 
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make the right choice. Moreover, their preferences may not be well-ordered or they are too 
complex. In this context, learning plays a crucial role. Actors can obtain new information related 
to their policy goals as well as information about their opponents’ preferences during the 
informal and formal negotiations with other actors. Confronted with new information, individuals 
reassess their beliefs and, as a result of this, they may change, a) their strategies as they 
consider the new strategy to be the optimal to achieve their prior preferences or, b) their 
preferences, since they consider that the new goals will “better” satisfy their basic or 
fundamental interests.5  
 
This article distinguishes between simple and complex learning (Stein, 1994: 171; Levy, 1994: 
286). In the first case, as a result of new information and the processing/interpretation of this 
information, actors learn new strategies to better achieve their specific ends. Complex learning 
leads to a change in beliefs about the situation itself, the policy goals, or even to a re-definition 
of interests. However, complex learning is less likely to occur than simple learning, especially at 
the level of fundamental or basic interests.6 This type of learning is also more difficult to verify 
by empirical research.  
 
It is important to note that learning does not always imply a policy change. Individual learning is 
considered as a crucial factor in explaining policy change,7 but to have this impact it needs to be 
institutionalised, i.e. transferred from the individual to the institution. Thus, organizational 
learning means “the institutionalization of individually learned lessons into organizational 
routines and procedures” (Levy, 1994: 311). Organizational learning proceeds in this way: 
“environmental feedback leads to individual learning, which leads to individual action to change 
organizational procedures, which leads to a change in organizational behavior, which leads to 
further feedback” (Levy: 288). Yet, individual learning does not always lead to organisational 
learning. Organisational learning then means more than individual learning by individual policy-
makers since the process of institutionalisation can be interrupted at any stage stalling learning 
processes.  For example, individual learning may take place, but then a change in personnel 
would prevent this learning being institutionalised in the routines of the organisation. Or, 
individuals stay, but they do not have enough institutional resources within the organisation to 
introduce changes. In contrast, it will be easier for actors that occupy strategic or top positions 
in an organisation to institutionalise the lessons they have learnt and hence, the importance of 
who learns (Bennet, 2004; Stein, 1994).  
 
Scope conditions for learning in CFSP 
 
Another question which arises from the discussion on learning is: when should we expect 
learning to occur in CFSP? Here some scope conditions for learning are identified in order to 
guide the empirical research:8  
 
1. Learning is more likely to occur when actors are in a new and/or uncertain environment. For 
example, learning is more likely in periods of crisis or structural change. In these situations, 
individuals are “cognitively motivated to analyze new information” (Checkel, 2001: 562). This 
hypothesis of learning within a new and uncertain environment clearly applies to the case of the 
new Member States since they started to participate as active observers in the CFSP Working 
Groups. For instance, following from their participation in CFSP institutions, the new Member 
States have introduced changes in the structure of their MFAs.9 The national representatives 
learnt that instructions should be formulated not merely stating the national position, but “in a 
reactive manner” (reacting to developments in CFSP and when possible taking the initiative), 
and not in too radical terms. Participation in the meetings of the Council Working Groups also 
allowed them to identify the informal working procedures and the interplay among the different 
                                                 
5 It is assumed here that the policy preferences of the Member States are not fixed, but they can change as a 
result of the interactions within the CFSP framework, for instance, as a result of learning.  
6 According to Tetlock’s argument, one can distinguish different levels in foreign policy beliefs systems: tactical 
beliefs at the lower level, strategic beliefs at the medium level and fundamental beliefs and policy goals at the 
highest level (Tetlock in Levy, 1994: 286).  
7 As discussed in the literature on policy convergence or policy transfer (Holzinger and Knill, 2005) 
8Adapted from Checkel (2001) and also from some rationalist literature on individual learning (Levy, 1994; Stein, 
1994). 
9 Interviews with national diplomats in Brussels, 2005.  
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Council bodies and how to use formal (COREU) and other informal channels of 
communication.10  
 
The fact that the EU has only recently engaged in crisis management operations has also 
provided an opportunity to learn from these new experiences (learning by doing). For instance, 
EU officials have realised that better mechanisms of co-ordination were required among the civil 
and military actors on the ground in order to increase coherence and effectiveness. Learning 
gathered in several EU’s crisis management exercises (CME) and operations has led to 
changes at the decision-making level with the creation of a Civ/Mil Cell within the General 
Secretariat’s structures in order to better coordinate EU civilian and military crisis management 
operations and the draft of an EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning.11 At the operational 
level, the first EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided the EU with a significant 
amount of information about how these types of missions could be improved in terms of 
coherence and effectiveness (Juncos, 2006).12  
 
2. Learning is more likely to occur when the individuals have few prior, not strongly internalised 
beliefs. In this case, individuals are more receptive to new ideas and willing to change their prior 
beliefs (Checkel, 2001: 563; Levy: 1994: 302; Stein, 1994). This point was also confirmed by the 
interviews with national diplomats involved in CFSP working groups. For instance, those who 
had not dealt with the Balkans before arriving in Brussels acknowledged that they learnt a lot 
and that they did it very quickly. In contrast, those who had been dealing with the Balkan region 
at their national ministries mentioned that following from their participation in the CFSP Working 
Groups they had not learn anything or that it only confirmed their previous beliefs.13 However, 
more empirical evidence is needed regarding this condition.  
 
3. Learning is more likely to occur from perceived failure than from success. Individuals are 
more willing to reassess their beliefs in situations of perceived failure. On the contrary, 
perceived success does not usually have an impact on prior beliefs.14 If objectives have been 
achieved, actors will not be motivated to change or reassess their previous beliefs, to learn from 
new information or from past experience. Therefore, success often leads to continuity, not to 
change (Levy, 1994: 305). Moreover, the incentive to learn will be even higher in cases of 
“unexpected” failure or success than when it was already anticipated by policy-makers.  
 
Learning from failure has often been mentioned as a source of change in the EU’s foreign 
policy. That was the case, for example, after the failure of the EU to prevent and to stop the 
conflict in the Former Yugoslavia. The experience was even more painful because it was 
unexpected by most EU leaders. Thus, at the beginning of the conflict, holding the EU 
Presidency, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos stated “If one problem can be 
solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem” (quoted in Nuttall, 2000: 200). One of the 
lessons of the Bosnian conflict was that “real wars” did not disappear from the continent and 
that they could erupt less than a two-hour flight from Brussels (Gnesotto, 1994). The CFSP, if 
worthy of its name one day, will not have to deal with direct threats to the EU’s territory, but 
rather with peace-keeping and peace-management in its neighbouring areas. It took some 
years (and two more conflicts in the Balkans) to institutionalise the lessons, but the EU finally 
managed to, as the deployment of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions in 
the Balkans show. According to Solana:  
 
(t)he experience of the Balkans has been a sobering one for the European Union. But 
it has I believe also provided us with an opportunity (…) The Balkans has shown that 
the European Union can no longer remain a force for peace simply through example. 
It has also to be forthright in defending the basic values of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law on which it is founded (Solana, 2000). 
 
                                                 
10 Interviews with national diplomats, Brussels, 2005.  
11 Interviews with Council Secretariat officials, April-November 2005.  
12  See for example, Council Secretariat and European Commission (2003), Council Secretariat (2003).  
13 Interviews with national diplomats, Brussels, 2005.  
14 However, on some occasions, it can serve to strengthen the degree of confidence in previous beliefs, which 
also constitutes a type of learning.  
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The same applies to the EU’s reaction to the Iraq conflict. According to Everts and Keohane, 
“(t)he EU’s handling of Iraq was an abysmal failure. But there are signs –including the 
Convention itself, Solana’s security strategy and the latest developments in ESDP- that the 
Europeans are learning from that fiasco” (2003: 183).15 
 
4. Institutional settings have an impact on the incidence of learning. Institutions can facilitate 
learning through specific institutional mechanisms (see below). Moreover, the type of 
institutional setting will determine the chances of learning taking place. Learning is more likely to 
occur when the interactions take place in less politicised settings, such as meetings of experts 
(Working Groups) than when interactions take place in high-level politicised settings (like the 
European Council or the Council of Ministers). In less politicised settings, actors are more willing 
to reassess their prior beliefs when confronted with new information. Moreover, at this level 
informal contacts and communicative practices are more frequent, setting the ground for 
learning. For example, some authors have pointed to how “epistemic communities”, at the level 
of experts, can promote certain changes in policies and norms that were blocked at higher 
levels (Haas, 1992). As M.E. Smith (2003: 91) argued, it is an important factor that the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), and later the CFSP, became institutionalised in a formal 
body composed of lower-level diplomats and technical experts, instead of senior officials, 
because the degree of cooperation can increase easily among these ‘epistemic communities’. 
This increasing cooperation has facilitated learning.  
 
Channels of learning in CFSP 
 
CFSP institutions provide mechanisms that facilitate learning. For this reason, an institutionalist 
approach is particularly suitable to explain how learning takes place within the CFSP. For 
instance, repeated formal and informal meetings between the Member States, as well as the 
establishment of specific EU institutions like the Policy Unit or the Joint Situation Centre provide 
EU officials and Member States’ representatives with information about policy consequences. 
Furthermore, during the negotiations taking place in the Council, the Member States’ 
representatives have the opportunity to increase their knowledge about a specific issue thanks 
to the information provided by other Member States and EU actors (the Commission or the High 
Representative). According to Eising, “(d)uring these negotiations, the member states ‘get the 
facts right’ and acquire ‘common knowledge’ ” (2002: 90). Confronted with this new information 
Member States’ diplomats might be induced to re-assess their prior beliefs. In this way, learning 
from new information can lead to a change in prior beliefs or the development of new ones 
(Eising: 88).  
 
For the purpose of this study, it is interesting to trace the channels of individual and 
organisational learning in the CFSP context. Channels of learning among the Member States 
representatives vary from transnational networks of experts and diplomats, to twinning 
programmes, or participation in formal negotiations at the EU level. On some occasions this 
learning can be the cause of policy transfer or institutional change, as in the case of changes in 
the structure of MFA of the new Member States (see above). New information obtained from 
interaction with others is an important source of learning, but the Member States can also learn 
from their own experience, in particular, from their own mistakes. For example, regarding the 
Polish officials learning how to prepare instructions for the Working Groups, a Polish official 
from the MFA declared: “it was learning on our own mistakes because nobody told us how to do 
it (…) It was our own experience”.16  
 
Processes of learning at the EU level –in other words, the EU’s learning from its own foreign 
policy activities– may result from the evaluation of its own experience, as in the cases of 
Yugoslavia or Iraq. In addition to this, the EU also learns from the information gathered about 
the experiences of other international actors (UN, OSCE, US, its own Member States). New 
information is channelled by several EU institutions located in Brussels (like the Policy Unit or 
the Commission), or some CFSP institutions set in specific geographical areas like the EU 
                                                 
15 This point has also been confirmed by several interviewees, Brussels, 2005.  
16  Interviews in Warsaw, May 2005.  
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Special Representatives or the EU Monitoring Mission.17 Usually, learning on the ground would 
be incorporated into the Mission’s Reviews (EUSRs or ESDP Mission Reviews) or into the 
Lesson Identified/Lessons Learned reports (ESDP missions). These documents, which are 
written by experts on the ground, are then submitted to the Political and Security Committee 
(PSC), through the High Representative. Changes to current missions are decided at the PSC 
and approved at the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) taking into 
consideration these reports. In this way, learning becomes institutionalised. Yet, given the EU’s 
limited intelligence gathering capacity, it is still extremely dependent on the information provided 
by the Member States.  
 
In the CFSP context, it is also worth bearing in mind the distinction between individual and 
organisational learning presented before since on some occasions individual learning may not 
lead to policy change due to institutional and political obstacles. Crucial among these are the 
lack of resources to implement the lessons learned, the organisational culture, problems of 
internal communication or changes in the organisation’s staff (high rotation levels mean that 
individual learning does not remain in the organisation once those individuals have left). These 
organisational factors might prevent the institutionalisation of learning at the CFSP level. For 
example, some Polish representatives learnt the importance of arranging informal meetings, 
outside of the negotiation room, often over lunch. Nonetheless, as they admit, lack of financial 
resources (representative funds) makes it difficult to put into practice.18 Other learned lessons 
included the need to speed up the decision-making process at the ministry level, to give more 
responsibility to lower level officials, to increase the capacity to formulate policy initiatives and to 
increase consultation with other European capitals. However, the characteristics of national 
ministries and their working cultures are still sometimes a constraint to introducing newly 
learned approaches, according to some national representatives in Brussels.19 
 
To sum up, this section highlighted the relevance of learning in CFSP as a driving force for 
change. It also identified some scope conditions under which learning is more likely to occur. 
The analysis of the process of institutionalisation of learning at the CFSP level and of those 
factors that may stall such a process seems particularly relevant for further research. In the next 
section, the article moves on to analyse the second process identified earlier: strategic 
socialisation. Socialisation results from a specific type of learning: one occurring within a group. 
Arguably, in the case of CFSP, learning is an indispensable stage in the process of 
socialisation. This process matches the conditions outlined in the above section, in particular 
those concerning learning in the new environment and less politicised settings (conditions 1 and 
4). First embedded into the national diplomatic environment, as soon as they start to participate 
in the Council meetings, national representatives learn a new code of conduct that they later 
use in a strategic way. 
 
 
Strategic socialisation in CFSP 
 
National foreign policy officials are now interconnected with their European partners, from the 
process of formulating positions and exchanging information, to agreeing on common collective 
responses. This is done in Brussels, at a lower level, through a network of national 
representatives, remaining in close and regular contact with each other. The process of 
socialisation can be observed in the emergence of a friendly, informal atmosphere which is 
complemented by the consensus seeking rule and keeping everyone on-board. The main aim of 
this section is to give an insight to the occurrence of socialisation in CFSP by providing 
empirical evidence. Emphasis is placed on explaining how socialisation is used in a strategic 
way. 
 
This section also draws attention to the peculiarity of the situation of national representatives to 
the Working Groups, which lies in their association with two environments: the national one 
                                                 
17 In these cases, it is of particular interest the links between the implementation and the decision-making levels 
or how learning on the ground is institutionalised and incorporated into new decisions, improving EU’s coherence 
and effectiveness. 
18 This view was expressed by few interviewees, Brussels, 2005. 
19 Interviews in Brussels, 2005. 
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(MFA) and the European one (the Council). CFSP is perceived as an intergovernmental policy 
and, hence, diplomats are expected in their capitals to represent national interest and bargain 
for the best possible outcome. However, once they arrive in Brussels, they begin to adapt their 
behaviour to the rules of the group they attend (the code of conduct), as part of a strategy to 
achieve optimal outcomes for their country, but that is also in line with the consensus within the 
group. Reflecting on their own behaviour, however, they do not see themselves as ‘going 




Socialisation has been analysed by social scientists as a “process by which social interaction 
leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting” (Johnston, 2001: 493). 
For the purpose of this study, it is defined as adaptation of certain rules of behaviour, ‘ways of 
doing things’, stemming from interaction with members of the same group. This process results 
in the establishment of a ‘we-feeling’ among the policy-makers and may lead to emergence of a 
common ‘role identity’ (Deutsch, 1957: 5-7). Nonetheless, according to the literature, actors do 
not change their behaviours and views the moment they enter into the new environment or 
group (Beyers, 2002). Instead, they start a process of learning the group’s rules and 
simultaneously participate in the group’s dynamics and legitimisation of appropriate behaviours. 
Therefore, socialisation does not imply internalisation of the behavioural rules at its first stage. 
Only later, this process may result in the internalisation of the code of conduct. Such 
internalisation means ‘taken for grantedness’, so that the values and rules, “are not only hard to 
change, but that the benefits of behaviour are calculated in abstract social terms rather than 
concrete consequential terms” (Johnston, 2001: 495).  
 
Before internalisation occurs, socialisation may be better perceived as a strategic action 
undertaken by actors, pursuing their interests and resulting from rational cost-benefit 
calculations. This will be referred to in the article as ‘strategic socialisation’. Sociological 
accounts of socialisation have underestimated the strategic use of norms and practices 
(Schimmelfennig, 2000: 135). The actors’ motivation to follow social pressures stems from the 
desire to maintain or improve their position within the group, as part of their long-term interest 
calculation. Legitimacy and reputation, factors contributing to actor’s status in a group, become 
highly appreciated as they improve the chances of getting the national interest reflected in the 
policy outcome. The credibility of the actor is particularly important in the case of iterated 
negotiations, such as those taking place in the EU, where frequent and repetitive contacts with 
the same group of officials occur. Such conceptualisation of socialisation does not exclude that 
in the long-term, especially when actors remain in the same group for long time periods, the 
behavioural rules become naturally done things (internalised). 
 
In the context of CFSP, this strategic behaviour is possible because national diplomats 
seconded to Brussels are not just shaped by the structure, but they are also reactive and ‘self-
reflective’. This means that they are able to interpret their own behaviour in the social context 
(Glarbo, 1999: 648). In the case of CFSP, where arguably evidence of internationalisation of 
norms is still lacking, compliance with ‘cognitive scripts’ can be explained by the strategic 
factors: long-term perspective of the negotiations and reputation. The article now turns to 
analyse socialisation as it occurs in CFSP, especially on the level of Working Groups.  
 
Socialising diplomats: linking theory with CFSP practice 
 
National representatives attending the meetings of the CFSP institutions have been “exposed to 
a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding” (Beyers, 2002) that some called esprit de 
corps. For his part, Tonra (2001: 261) asserts that even though there is no evident ‘European’ 
policy identity, there is already a “basic commitment and belief in joint policy-making”. A national 
representative, referring to the esprit de corps, claimed: “It does exist. People just know each 
other privately, invite each other for the meetings, also on private grounds, discuss various 
issues and some kind of community emerges… lets call it community of thinking or community 
of common views”.20 Arguably, the club-like atmosphere, specific to foreign policy-making, still 
                                                 
20 As another representative claimed: “There is a kind of family atmosphere in a group, I probably spend more 
time with my group colleagues than with the other representatives from my country”. (Interviews in Brussels, 
February and July 2005).  
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exists nowadays, after the recent EU enlargement. Despite often expressed doubts, whether 
this esprit de corps would continue when more actors take a seat around the table, some 
practitioners claim that the informal cooperation has increased after the enlargement. One of 
them stated: “As there are now 25 states in the room, more is done outside, drafting is often 
done informally”21 and in a similar tone, another one asserted: “The enlargement process has 
strengthened the tendency to make all major decisions outside the formal meetings”.22  
 
Informal consultations prior to the meeting are part of every-day work of the representatives, as 
“many issues appear ‘pre-cooked’ in the agenda, especially the sensitive ones”23. 
Representatives of some Working Groups often attend numerous meetings of informal, so-
called ‘like-minded’ groups, based on similar interests on certain issues. These groups operate 
on a very informal basis and usually the participants credit each other with trust. An example of 
this may serve an incident, when a higher-ranked diplomat was denied access to the group, on 
the grounds that it would “infringe the group’s intimacy”.24 One of the results of this ‘diplomatic 
intersubjectivity’ has been the emergence of a common code of conducting foreign policy 
(Glarbo, 1999: 645). Both, the literature and our recent empirical study on several external 
relations Working Groups point to the existence and importance of such informal codes of 
practices: 
 
I. Consultation or coordination reflex. A process of information sharing, before any decisions are 
taken and often even before the formal national position is formulated, provides the basis for the 
national officials’ work. The coordination reflex is perceptible in the increase communicative 
practices among the CFSP officials. These practices take place through formal channels, such 
as COREU or mailing lists of the Working Groups. Nonetheless, a large bulk of information-
sharing is informal and occurs in the corridors and “over lunch”. As one representative 
expressed it: “I am trying to meet my colleagues on a frequent basis: during the group formal 
meetings, but also before and afterwards, during lunches and any other gatherings”.25 The 
representatives remain in close contact through e-mails, mobile phones and frequent meetings, 
either bilateral or within “informal” coalition groups. As one of the diplomats has recently put it: 
“If you don’t exchange information, you are nobody”.26 European states no longer feel 
threatened by sharing information with their European colleagues. On the contrary, they have 
multiplied their mutual exchanges. Some of them admit they even share selected sensitive 
information with their counterparts, in particular if it helps to reach a compromise. Such 
information includes for example circulating national instructions, security assessments or other 
political information on a strategic level.27 
 
This coordination reflex also implies a tendency to take others’ views into account when 
formulating national positions (instructions). Many foreign policy-makers and CFSP officials 
acknowledged the fact that it became a ‘natural’ reflex, meaning taking into consideration what 
would be acceptable for their European partners, rather than simply what the national position, 
based on national interest would be. According to a practitioner: “… where there is ever any 
new foreign policy initiative in the making, the first reflex is European. The question is now what 
will our European partners say – what is the opinion in Europe” (Tonra, 2001: 261). 
Significantly, the reflex coordination appears as a ‘habit’, a naturally ‘done thing’, in contrast with 
rational calculations to pursue self-interested preferences.  
 
II. A consensus building practice. CFSP is a subject of intergovernmental bargaining with states 
retaining their veto powers (with few exceptions) and for this reason it is a general practice to 
“keep everyone on-board”. Officials emphasize the “habit of thinking in terms of consensus” (as 
                                                 
21 Interviews in Brussels, 2005. 
22 On-line survey on Council Working Groups, 2005/2006. New Member States have quickly learnt the 
importance of informal contacts between the experts at Working Group level. As stated by an official of the Polish 
MFA: “We are learning some procedures. I am not talking about the formal aspects, because these are relatively 
easy to grasp. I am rather thinking of the skills to build informal coalitions, agreeing on positions in the corridors, 
in the early stage, in order to avoid clashes later on. The British are the best example”. (Interview in Warsaw, 
2005) 
23 On-line survey on Council Working Groups, 2005/2006. 
24 Interviews in Brussels, 2005. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 On-line survey on Council Working Groups, 2005/2006. 
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quoted in Tonra, 2001: 261). The Member States’ diplomats try to generate a broad agreement 
regarding the decision, so no Member State is excluded (decisions by QMV) or auto-excluded 
(resorting to constructive abstention). The objective is to avoid isolation of any Member State’s 
position in the decision-making process, as well as taking any decision that could damage the 
interest of a single country or a group of countries (Laffan, 2001). It is a two-way process 
because not only will the majority try to integrate the minority, but also the potentially isolated 
state will try to find supporters, instead of behaving unilaterally. 
 
Effectiveness, understood by national diplomats in terms of reaching an agreement, is highly 
appreciated and, as asserted by one practitioner, “whoever is a troublemaker causes 
disapproval”.28 The national representatives often have a common interest in producing results 
at the end of the day. It is not rare that at the final stages of a long meeting the pressure 
stemming from the group and the Presidency is high for reaching agreement and not leaving 
any unsolved problem to be passed on to a higher political level. As stated by a diplomat “there 
is always a pressure to get an agreement, if you don’t get a result, you have nothing. (...) we 
have to achieve meaningful results, a result in substance”.29 
 
Maintaining ‘positive’ relations with other representatives and trying to avoid direct clashes of 
positions in the forum of the Working Group are among the main informal practices. A practice 
widely adopted by Belgian representatives is: “do what you think is appropriate, but try to 
improve European decision-making, do not make enemies and ensure that you have a positive 
working relationship with everyone” (as quoted in Beyers, 2002). Similarly, it is in good practice 
to seriously consider Commission’s proposals as well as the deals proposed by the presidency.  
 
III. Other codes of conduct. Another principle is the existence of domaines réservés. These are 
issues that cannot be submitted to discussion and interference from the other Member States. 
Traditionally, these areas covered security issues (national defence, borders, nuclear status or 
neutrality) and special relationships. For example, a diplomat from the Working Group on 
Western Balkans listed the transatlantic relations as “a sensitive issue” that would not usually be 
raised during the meetings. On the other hand, a member of a group dealing with transatlantic 
relations pointed out that any politically “hot” matters in EU-US relations, such as Iraq, were 
always kept out of the discussions.30  
 
There are also more detailed rules of behaviour and often their breaching is perceived by others 
as “inappropriate”, leading to a decrease in one’s credibility in the group. These are the rules 
referring to the manner of presenting instructions, courtesy towards other group members or the 
language used. They include, for example: 
 
? No contradicting the position taken before on a higher level in the Working Group, not 
opening the issues previously closed in a Working Group on a higher political forum and 
definitely not contradicting the positions on different forums. As one of the representatives 
put it: “It should not be that the representative says nothing in the Working Group, 
because he is asleep and than it comes out on a higher level – this is a clear breach of 
procedures! This could just happen in extreme circumstances”.31  
 
? When instructions are considered by the representative to be “difficult to justify” within the 
group, they would usually resort to the phrase “according to my instructions…” or 
“according to my capital…”32. This is an informal sign to other group members, contrary to 
beginning your contribution with “We think…”. 
 
IV. Legitimacy, credibility and interactions with the capitals. National representatives learn the 
‘code of conduct’ and apply it in their everyday work. As mentioned above, it is often a strategic 
action, aimed at strengthening one’s position in the group and raising the chances of success in 
the future. From this perspective, adoption of the group’s rules is a tactical move, a sort of 
negotiation strategy, employed in order to achieve their goals and not because it is “the right 
                                                 
28 Interviews in Brussels, 2005. 
29 Ibid. 
30 On-line survey on Council Working Groups, 2005/2006. 
31 Interviews in Brussels, 2005. 
32 Several confidential interviews in Brussels confirmed that practice. 
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thing to do”. It is due to the fact, that legitimacy and credibility within the group are high at stake 
among the national representatives in the Council. As claimed by one of them, “credibility is 
something you gain if you are constructive in the discussions”33. One diplomat referred to two 
types of credibility in the Council: both personal and country’s credibility. Independently from the 
state’s credibility, once the position of the diplomat within the group is strong, it is generally 
perceived easier to negotiate and make one’s voice heard. Eventually, for the practitioners, it all 
comes down to “having your amendments approved”, which is a sign that your strategy works.34 
Breaking the code, especially by forcing a position that is very radical or simply ‘unforceable’ is 
badly perceived by other group members. Hence, “later on, whatever you say, even if these are 
the best ideas, they are ignored in silence… That is why I have to build my position, everyone 
has to know I am pragmatic and ready to negotiate”.35 The representatives take into account the 
long-term results of the negotiations and are sometimes ready to make minimal concessions in 
their national short-term preferences, should it improve their overall standing within the group 
and increase the chances of success in more important issues.  
 
Nonetheless, a crucial question to be asked regards the position that they want to achieve. Is 
the original national position or has it been modified by their interactions in Brussels? The 
representatives emphasise the difference between the perceptions of officials in Brussels and 
those in the capital, which occasionally leads to discussion over the instructions or convincing 
the capital that the instructions should be changed for the sake of the state’s credibility in the 
group. In such cases they argue that the national position is not “quite in tune with the 
negotiating atmosphere here in Brussels”.36 In this way, national diplomats are able to use their 
expertise and institutional position to influence not only European politics and decision making, 
but also their foreign ministries (Spence, 2002: 33).  
 
This tension experienced by the national representatives is due to the fact that they are 
embedded in two social environments: domestic and European (Beyers, 2002). The latter is 
learnt after their arrival in Brussels and the first one is subsequently modified. The diplomats 
sometimes act as ‘change agents’ in relation to their own national administration. The process 
starts during their stay abroad, but the influence can be exerted even stronger after their return 
to the capitals (the so called ‘contagion’ effect; see Page and Wouters, 1995: 197). In this way, 
they may take an active part in the process of Europeanisation of national foreign policies in 
both directions: national adaptation and promoting national policy goals on the European level. 
Those capital officials that spent even a few weeks training in Brussels claimed that it allowed 
them to see the work of their colleagues from different perspective and to understand better 
what was expected from the capital. Those that left the capitals and started working in Brussels 
felt the growing gap between themselves and their colleagues from the ministry. One of them 
observed that in Brussels “everything changes faster, when it comes to the mentality of the 
diplomats” and that the people in the capital “become frustrated, as they feel that we are getting 
further away and then the lack of understanding appears”.37 
 
This final part of the article illustrated the tension between these two, often conflicting, 
behavioural logics: the national and the EU one. They are reflected in the misunderstandings 
between strategic actors, exposed to a new environment and processes of socialisation on one 
side and their colleagues in the capitals on the other. The most interesting aspect is that these 
two logics are working simultaneously in the case of national representatives in the CFSP 





The aim of this article was to demonstrate on the recent empirical findings that the processes of 
socialisation and learning occur in CFSP and how they can be utilised to explain some 
important aspects of the decision-making process and the policy substance. The institutional 
design of the CFSP provides fertile grounds for these cognitive processes to occur. Both 
                                                 




37 Ibid.  
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learning and socialisation are conceived here as being rational, undertaken by strategic actors 
who are influenced by their social environment. Individual learning is important as a pre-
condition for organisational learning. The core of the research should focus on the process of 
institutionalisation of this learning in the CFSP context and on the factors that may hinder it. 
More research providing empirical evidence on the conditions established earlier in order to 
verify or falsify them will help to increase our understanding about when and under which 
conditions learning is likely to occur in the context of CFSP/ESDP.  
 
It was argued throughout the article, that learning and strategic socialisation are intertwined 
together. Actors begin their socialisation by learning the group rules and then use them in a 
strategic way in order to achieve their preferences. The inclusion of both processes in the 
analysis of European foreign policy allows for a better understanding of how change and 
decisions take place at the EU level, but also at the national level (i.e. explaining the process of 
Europeanisation of national foreign policy).  
 
The empirical findings supporting this article point at the unsuitability of the existing, somewhat 
artificial division, between rational and sociological approaches. Such a division limits the range 
of explanatory variables available to make sense of CFSP dynamics. For example, rational 
choice accounts conceive learning in individualistic terms where the social context does not 
have any impact. According to the empirical evidence gathered by this research, the institutional 
and social context have an impact on learning (scope condition 4). On the other hand, 
sociological accounts tend to underestimate the possibility of self-reflective actors using 
socialisation as part of their strategic calculations. Empirical evidence from CFSP shows that 
the behaviour of actors does not strictly fall into any of the categories established in the 
literature (rationalist/sociological). The approach adopted here intends to go beyond the strict 
division between them.  
 
Finally, the specific institutional setting of CFSP, being a mixture between intergovernmental 
and communitarian arrangements, highlighted the role of actors embedded in two 
environments. National diplomats, being at the cross-roads of these two settings, constitute a 
focal point of this study. The CFSP literature has to a large extend neglected the tension that 
arises between the new behavioural logic learned by national diplomats from its participation in 
the Council Working Groups, and the behavioural logic in which they were fully embedded 
before (the national one). These two logics are not always in line. This situation allows the 
national diplomats to play a role of change agents in their national policies. Even though they 
perceive themselves as “national champions” of the positions from their capitals, arguably, as a 
consequence of an undergoing process of socialisation within the Council, their actions are 
constrained. Hence, they cannot easily be conceived as being fully rational or ‘unintentional’. In 
the case of CFSP we rather have to think of a spectrum between the two, on which the actions 
may be positioned. In sum, the article could serve as a starting point for a new research agenda 
that should start questioning the conception of what it means to be strategic and in which way 
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